Authentication proves who is calling; authorization decides what that caller may do to which record, at this moment. This site starts from one broker reading one insurance quote and climbs, one idea at a time, through sessions, authenticators, API keys, tokens, OAuth and OIDC, access-control models, policy engines, tenants, certificates, workload identity, Kafka, cloud IAM and private environments, up to AI agents that call models, MCP servers and retrieval while acting for people.
A broker logs in, an agent gathers evidence, and an underwriter records a decision. A successful login, a valid JWT, an mTLS connection or an x-app-id header each looks like trust, yet none of them says whether this caller may read this quote or write this decision. Auth engineering puts an explicit, audited, resource-specific decision at every hop, and keeps the agent's own identity apart from the authority a person delegated to it.
Identity primitives, people and proofing, sessions and browser security, passkeys and MFA, API keys, JWT anatomy, OAuth, OIDC and federation, per current standards.
Decisions from first principles, RBAC, ABAC and ReBAC, PEP, PDP and PIP, policy as code with OPA, Cedar and OpenFGA, tenant isolation, governance and privileged access.
TLS and PKI, SPIFFE workload identity, gateways and zero trust, Kafka ACLs, cloud IAM without secrets, webhooks and private controlled environments.
Model providers, MCP, retrieval ACLs, agents as delegates, A2A trust, coding agents and CI, audit, threat testing, rotation and revocation, framework profiles and playbooks.